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INTRODUCTION 
Two access systems are being implemented for LHC, 
the Access Safety System and the Access Control System.  
The Access Safety System is designed to handle the 
interlocks necessary to ensure the safety of personnel in 
and around the accelerator, either when it is in operation 
with beam or when access is allowed. The Access Safety 
System is based on sensors, actuators, PLC’s and safety 
links (cables or field-buses). The safety of the system 
must be demonstrated to external authorities. Apart from 
control room operators, users do not interact directly with 
the Access Safety System. 
The Access Control System [1] is designed to manage 
access into the LHC when the access conditions are met. 
It is based on industrial hardware and makes use of 
procedures for user interaction. 
The LHC Access Systems are distinct but work 
together to ensure the safety of personnel. They are 
designed for personnel safety but with operational 
efficiency in mind. 
RISKS 
There are many risks associated with the building and 
operation of a high energy accelerator such as LHC but 
most of these risks can also be found on industrial sites 
and do not require a specific access and interlock system. 
A complete review of the risks to be covered by the 
Access System was done in 2002 [2] and has been 
confirmed recently. 
Radiological Risks 
The access system will only protect against radiological 
risks associated with the operation of the LHC. These 
radiological risks stem from : 
1. The circulating or injected beams. The relevant 
processes are: beam interaction with residual gas 
molecules, physics events, normal beam losses on 
collimators and abnormal beam losses. 
2. RF cavities generating X-rays and other particles 
during conditioning or operation at high field 
gradients. 
3. Induced activity in materials and in air. 
4. Unshielded radioactive sources for detector 
calibration. 
The risks from 1 and 2 above will be covered by 
interlocks on beam injection or circulation and interlocks 
on the operation of RF cavities. The risk from induced 
activity will be covered by the radiation veto as well as 
procedures. Risks arising from unshielded radiation 
sources will be covered by procedures only. 
Conventional Risks 
It should be stressed that conventional risks are not 
covered by the LHC access systems although they can 
have more consequences than radiological risks in some 
cases. Conventional risks are covered by the usual general 
safety systems or by separate and specific systems. 
Training 
The access system will not protect the users from lack 
of training or improper training although training will be 
checked at the access point by the access control system 
and access will not be granted if training is lacking or 
obsolete. 
Personal Protection 
The access system will not control that the user is in 
possession of personal protection equipment such as hard 
hat, safety shoes or operational dosimeter. It is the 
responsibility of the user to wear or be in possession of its 
own protective equipment. 
Procedures 
The access system cannot protect the user in case a 
procedure is not applied or wrongly applied. The access 
systems as designed rely on the users behaving in a 
responsible way and according to safe procedures in order 
to ensure their safety with respect to some of the risks. 
ACCESSIBLE AREAS 
The underground areas that will be accessible in 
various modes of operation have been defined already [3]. 
From our recent experience some of the project engineers 
have not yet realized that all LHC underground 
installation will be under access control with mandatory 
dosimetry at all times and that most of the LHC 
underground installations will be interlocked with the 
beams and therefore will not be accessible during regular 
operation. This is in contrast with LEP where most of the 
underground installations were accessible during beam 
time. 
Sectorisation 
Sectorisation of the interlocked areas allows to 
distinguish between “Service zones”, where mostly 
accelerator ancillary equipment is located (power 
converters, klystrons, control racks…), and “Beam zones” 
which are directly affected by the presence of the beams 
[4]. There is also a separate sectorisation of “machine” 
and “experiments” and no passage is allowed between the 
two, except in case of emergency. 
The sectorisation also allows the definition of small 
zones containing specific equipment such as RF cavities, 
collimators, dump kickers and septa or the dump tunnels. 
These small zones must be defined either for specific 
risks (collimators, RF) or for operational reasons 
(kickers). 
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The sectorisation can help contain the extent of a 
problem and should be topologically simple to limit the 
use of resources, person-hours, required to patrol the 
accelerator. 
Access sectors are delimited by access points, sector 
doors and end-zone doors. 
Intrusions 
Should we therefore expect more intrusions than was 
the case for LEP, i.e. about once per year ? Fortunately 
the topology of the LHC is such that there are only few 
entry points to access into the underground installations 
and most emergency exit doors should not allow forcing 
the entry. We expect that the number of intrusions in the 
interlocked LHC underground areas will be of the same 
order as was the case for LEP; the consequence of an 
intrusion should be limited to a beam dump and a patrol 
to recover the safety conditions of the zone. 
Inner boundaries 
During beam operation the entire underground areas are 
monitored and each access equipment must stay in the 
safe position or the beams are dumped and injection made 
impossible. Given the larger number of access equipment 
as compared to LEP, should we expect more glitches and 
spurious interlocks from failing sensors or other spurious 
events ? We should first ensure that we minimize the 
number of access doors, gates and the overall number of 
equipment subject to these spurious triggering but this 
must be balanced by the need for sectorisation. 
Experience has also shown that quality equipment should 
be procured and properly maintained; this initially has a 
cost but so has the operational inefficiency of a collider. 
Finally a suggestion was made to turn off the 
monitoring, during beam operation, of all access 
equipment of the inner boundaries of the interlocked 
zones and only maintain monitoring of the outer shell of 
the interlocked zones. This should only be implemented 
as a last resort for there are cases where monitoring of 
inner boundaries is essential. 
In all cases the consequences of a spurious event are a 
beam dump and the operational time lost to diagnose and 
repair the equipment and to patrol the area to recover the 
safety conditions of the zone. 
End-zone doors 
End-zone doors mark the boundary between interlocked 
zones of different natures or between interlocked zones 
and non-interlocked zones. They should only be crossed 
in case of emergency Sign-posting on the doors will 
clearly indicate this policy. Using an end-zone door will 
trigger a technical alarm in the control rooms and possibly 
a local alarm at the door; it will also require an on-site 
intervention to re-arm the door and a patrol of the affected 
zones to recover the safety conditions. 
INTERLOCKS 
There should be as few interlocks as really necessary to 
ensure personnel protection. From the risks to be covered 
it is clear that interlocking the circulation and injection of 
beams is absolutely necessary and interlocking of the RF 
cavities is also mandatory. For each beam interlock 
function, three diversely redundant interlock points are 
provided as a long-standing CERN rule; for circulating 
beams and two injection lines, this makes a total of nine 
interlock points. The list of all beam interlock points will 
be published soon. 
Interlock points must be demonstrably safe and we 
have chosen to standardize on two technologies for beam 
interlocks:  
• 18 kV cells can be opened to effectively turn 
off the field in a magnet by cutting the power 
source to the power converter. The mechanism 
is the same as for an emergency stop. 
• Movable objects can be driven into the beam 
path to prevent its passage. 
The radiation veto is an external interlock acting on 
access equipment to prevent access when radiological 
conditions for access are not met. Other risks from 
induced activity and/or radiological sources are not 
covered by interlocks. 
Fallback procedures 
An interlock point must always be kept in a safe 
position during access and special care must be taken for 
test or maintenance of these interlock points during 
access: a procedure will allow one interlock point at a 
time to be removed from the interlock chain provided that 
compensatory measures are implemented in the form of 
approved additional interlock points together with a clear 
and safe procedure. 
Dealing with unscheduled problems with interlock 
points must also be foreseen and a safe procedure will be 
made available. This however will entail delays in the 
repairs as compared to the same repair on standard 
equipment. There a very few equipment concerned : two 
chains of magnets in the ring with one power converter 
each, and a few power converters and magnets in the 
transfer lines. A few movable objects are also concerned. 
All interlock points must be available when operating 
with beam and the above-mentioned procedures are only 
valid for the purpose of maintenance and repair and not 
for beam operation. 
Safety Console  
The access safety system is driven via the safety 
console in the control room : by selecting the appropriate 
access mode it is possible to lock the relevant safety 
equipment and allow the operation of others. The LHC 
safety console will use hardwired connections and toggle 
buttons instead of safety keys as we are used to for other 
accelerators. 
The activation of access interlocks at the level of 18 kV 
cells while the equipment beyond the electrical cell is 
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powered can cause damage and should be avoided as 
much as possible. Access procedures must specify that the 
interlocked equipment behind the electrical cells must be 
safely powered down before the interlock is applied. For 
the special case of the interlock of the RF cavity a short 
delay of about two seconds will be introduced between 
the triggering of the interlock chain and the immediate 
stop of the RF in the cavities and the interlock at the level 
of 18 kV electrical cells; this short delay will be used to 
ramp-down the klystron power supplies to a safe level 
before the electrical supply is cut, thereby avoiding 
damage to sensitive RF equipment. 
Similarly a normal beam dump must be triggered via 
the LHC control system before an access interlock 
triggers the beam dump via redundant paths. Access 
interlocks for circulating beam will perform their function 
of killing the circulating beam but, if the beam dump does 
not function properly beforehand, cannot do it without 
creating major damage. 
These hard events with potential damage to equipment 
and the machine can be avoided during normal operation 
through the application of proper procedures. 
ACCESS TYPES 
In order to match the requirements of the schedule for 
operation presented at Chamonix XIII it is proposed to 
make a distinction between different access types 
according to several criteria including the access duration, 
the purpose of the access, whether the access can have an 
impact on the physics program and the accessible zones. 
The following description is a proposal for discussion. 
Shadow Access 
A shadow access takes place during the cycling of the 
machine between fills. It will be used for urgent repairs 
which are vital for the next fill or fills. It is by definition 
unscheduled and the decision to grant it is with the 
engineer in charge or the machine coordinator. Because it 
is granted in the shadow of the cycling time it should not 
have an impact on the program. Since the available time 
is too short to wait for the decay of radionuclides in the 
air in beam zones, only the service areas will be 
accessible and only in the Restricted mode of operation 
under the supervision of the machine control room. 
Short stop 
A short stop is defined to last less than a few days and 
we assume that we keep the full shift organisation and 
supervision in place during this stop. The purpose for 
access will be to repair equipment as needed for the 
program in the next few weeks, as well as quick fixes and 
light maintenance. Short stops will be scheduled, if 
possible, by the machine coordinator and the physics 
coordinator. A short stop should have only minimal 
impact on the physics programme if unscheduled, and the 
accessible areas will be both the service and beam zones. 
The access mode will be the Restricted mode as much as 
possible in order to avoid lengthy patrols afterwards. The 
supervision will be done from the machine control room 
but could be delegated to the experiments control rooms 
for their respective areas.  
Long stop 
A long stop could last up to a few weeks and we cannot 
assume that the we keep a full shift organisation and 
supervision in the control room. Access during a long 
stop will be for major repairs and to carry out 
maintenance. Long stops will normally be scheduled but 
could also be triggered by unscheduled events such as a 
breakdown. All areas will be accessible under the General 
or Restricted modes as required. Supervision from the 
control rooms will be limited but the General mode of 
access does not require supervision. The supervision, in 
Restricted mode, can also be delegated to experiments 
control rooms for their respective areas. 
Shutdown 
Shutdowns are long scheduled periods of stoppage 
which can be used for heavy maintenance and even 
upgrades or modifications to equipment. We assume that 
that operator presence in the control room is kept to the 
very minimum and access supervision is only possible if 
scheduled in advance. As for long stops all areas will be 
accessible. The General mode of access will be used as 
much as possible and lengthy patrols will be necessary 
before operation can resume. 
ACCESS CONTROL 
Access into all underground areas of the LHC will 
always be controlled : only registered, identified and 
trained personnel can be allowed in the LHC. A count and 
nominative log of all persons present will be kept for 
safety and operational reasons. The registration, training 
and authorization prior to access, as well as positive 
identification at the time of access are linked to the access 
control system. The access hardware (safety keys, 
personnel airlock, material passage…)  and usage 
procedures have been defined and must be validated in 
2005.  
Visitors 
Visitors who need to access in the underground areas of 
the LHC do not fall under the usual category of registered 
workers but the access control system should be able to 
accommodate them. 
VIP’s are not registered at CERN, they are not trained 
and cannot be submitted to identification at the access 
point. Since they cannot be expected to use the access 
control system in a normal way the access points will be 
opened and safety escorts will be provided. After a VIP 
access a complete closure and patrol of the zone must be 
done which makes this type of access quite costly in 
resources. 
Public visits will not be authorized in the machine itself 
but some of the experiments have expressed their 
intention to have public visits during shutdowns. Public 
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visitors are not  trained, cannot be registered and 
identified and cannot be expected to use access hardware 
in a normal way. The experiments must foresee a 
specially delimited zone, a specific access point to this 
zone and of course safety escort during the visit. Public 
visits should only be authorized during shutdowns and the 
zone accessed must be patrolled before regular operation 
can restart. Public visits will be done under the exclusive 
responsibility of the visited experiments. 
Professional visitors are typically visiting firms or 
collaborators. They may have to get access to the 
underground areas of the LHC for activities connected to 
their work but they should not actually carry out work 
activities. Professional visitors should be registered, 
receive a short safety briefing and agree to abide by the 
safety rules in force, including to carry or wear the 
required protective equipment and to follow all the 
instructions of an identified safety escort. They will 
receive an identifier and will use access points in a 
normal way. Provided that access procedures have been 
followed, a patrol of the zone is not necessary after the 
access by professional visitors. 
 
Safety Training 
Safety training will be checked at every access point as 
part of the access procedure. Based on the identification 
of the person requesting access the list of current safety 
training will be returned from a database and matched 
against the required training at a given access point. 
Access will not be granted if the required training is 
lacking or obsolete. Expiration dates associated with 
safety training will ensure that the personnel is regularly 
kept up to date on safety information and practice. Grace 
periods and automatic reminders will also be 
implemented to reduce to a strict minimum the number of 
accesses denied for lack of training. Computer based 
training should also be put in place where possible in 
order to make training and re-training convenient for staff 
but also for collaborators in the experiments who only 
come to CERN occasionally and for short periods. 
Different training courses should be offered to match 
the risks that the person might face. For example a 
general course for access into service zones will cover 
less subjects than a course for access into beam areas. 
Training should also cover specific risks such as radiation 
protection, electrical circuits, flammable gases and even 
first aid. 
Access control users and control room operators should 
also be trained on the procedures used to access into the 
LHC underground areas. 
Access Rights 
Access rights are granted by a person with a safety role, 
DSO or GLIMOS, for the areas under their responsibility. 
Access rights will be checked at all access points. The 
granularity of access rights should be significantly 
enhanced with respect to the situation of other 
accelerators. A finer grain for access rights will make it 
easier to keep control of the occupancy of an area. A first 
distinction between service and beam zones comes to 
mind but further access rights can be defined for each 
experiment and for specific zones like the beam cleaning, 
the dump and the RF insertions. A further subdivision has 
been requested by the experiments based e.g. on sub-
detectors. However this flexible system must also be 
managed and should not be abused by keeping the access 
right definitions simple and with clear responsibility. 
Access rights could also carry expiration dates or 
alternatively a regular cleanup of the database should be 
performed to keep the data up to date.  
Identification 
All users of the access control system should be 
registered at CERN; this covers the members of the 
CERN personnel, collaborators or external contractors. 
Since personal dosimetry is required in all underground 
areas of the LHC, we will tightly bind the identifier to the 
personal dosimeter to ensure that everyone is wearing 
their dosimeter in the LHC. The identifier will be read for 
each entry and each egress; it will be read without contact 
within a distance of a sensitive detector. Positive 
identification will be further implemented for entry by 
matching the declared identity of the person (identifier) to 
a biometrics verification of this identity.  
Pitfalls 
The above scheme for registration, authorisation, 
training and identification is already partly implemented 
at CERN but the whole process is spread over five 
departments with no single person responsible for the 
whole chain. This topic needs urgent attention already in 
the framework of the PS and SPS operation as well as 
LHC installation. 
Of course a number of technical problems can happen 
along the process: an expired safety training, after the 
grace period and despite email reminders, insufficient 
access rights, unreadable identifier or a biometrics check 
failure will cause the access to be denied and corrective 
action will have to be taken by the user as appropriate. 
The access control system is designed to work with 
minimum supervision and in these cases the control room 
operator will not have the means to bypass any of the 
components of the system. It is essential that the 
procedures are carefully checked before implementation 
and that the reliability and availability of the hardware is 
proven. 
In Restricted access mode the user must take and carry 
a safety key during the access. A limited number of keys 
will be available at each access point and this number will 
de facto limit the attendance in a particular zone in 
Restricted mode. For safety reasons a maximum number 
of persons will also be defined for each access zone. This 
maximum number will be checked by a counter and 
access will be denied when the maximum is reached. This 
is not expected to be a limitation for operation. 
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Access Hardware 
Personnel access will be done via an industrial type 
airlock mechanism at each access point. This will ensure 
the passage of only one person at a time and fast accesses 
provided the procedures are correctly followed. An 
airlock mechanism was already implemented for L3 at 
LEP and turnstiles are in use at the SPS and give 
satisfaction provided that user training is done rigorously. 
Material access will be done via a specific airlock 
mechanism at selected access points. No personnel will be 
allowed inside the airlock during its operation. 
In case of inoperative airlocks, a fallback procedure 
with guarded entrance for local supervision will be put in 
place. A strict procedure will then be applied with limited 
manual checks and a patrol will be required afterwards. 
Note that some access points are installed inside 
transport reservations and would have to be dismounted 
then remounted in case of large transport across some 
areas. The access hardware has been specified 
accordingly. 
EXPERIMENTS 
Experimental collaborations will operate detectors 
located in large caverns with specific risks that can be 
different from those of the machine. The users who need 
to access these caverns also normally do not need to 
access into the machine, and vice-versa. It has been 
decided to separate access into the machine from access 
into the experiments and implement a sectorisation of the 
underground areas accordingly. 
Further it has been agreed with the experimental 
collaborations that they will share the responsibility of the 
operation of access control with the machine control 
room: it will be possible to delegate some access control 
responsibility from the operators in the machine control 
room to the operators in the experiments’ control rooms 
via a handshake mechanism. This will be limited in scope 
to the actual supervision of the access process on the 
grounds that the operators in the experiments’ control 
rooms know best what is to be done, at why time and by 
whom, in the experiments’ caverns.  
We have also agreed that the experimental 
collaborations will take the responsibility of conducting 
the safety patrols in their zones. 
As a consequence care must be taken to identify who in 
the experimental collaborations will take these roles for 
both the operation of access and patrols, and to ensure 
that they receive appropriate training. 
The delegation of responsibility is a relatively new idea 
and still raises objections on both sides, machine and 
experimental collaborations. There seems however to be 
no economical alternative given the complexity of the 
installations and the limit on available resources. There is 
a clear possibility for example that the delegation of 
responsibility could lead to an abuse of the schedule by 
one of the experiment at the expense of the others by 
causing a schedule delay, but this situation should be 
quickly self-regulated by the experiments themselves. 
Mutual trust must be developed to handle all aspects of 
LHC operation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The access systems are being developed now and are in 
the industrialization phase for the access control system 
and the detailed design phase for the access safety system. 
They are designed for personal safety but with operational 
efficiency in mind. 
In 2005 work on the access control system will 
concentrate on finalizing and validating the operational 
procedures, including those for visitors. The reliability 
and availability of the system should be assessed and the 
situation of registration / authorization / training should 
be clarified and better defined for the future. 
Work on the access safety system will concentrate on 
the finalization of the functional and technical 
specifications, the definition of operating procedures and 
fallback scenarios for all envisaged failure modes. The 
safety demonstration document must also be prepared. 
I want to thank all the colleagues who are working to 
design and implement the LHC access systems, and in 
particular the access team of TS/CSE. 
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